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A computer Network Attack (CNA) has been defined as operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers 
and computer networks, or the computer networks themselves.1 Whether 
CNA operations are employed in offense or countered in defense, there are 
complex issues of proportionality, just as there are in conventional or kinetic at-
tack situations. This chapter e:l>.-plores some of the proportionality judgments an 
operational military commander must make. But first, it is useful to consider the 
capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of the computers and computer net-, 
works that are revolutionizing high-tech military forces. 
Operational Proliferation 
During the war in Kosovo and Yugoslavia, targets for NATO aircraft were 
developed and reviewed by a computerized network that linked, in real time, 
commanders, planners, intelligence officers, and data specialists on both sides of 
the Atlantic.2 Simultaneously, Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from surface 
ships and submarines were planned and directed using computer programs. In-
side an aircraft, tank, or the lifelines of a warship, there are computer chips at the 
heart of every weapons system. For example, to track Chinese M-9 missiles fired 
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into the Taiwan Straits in 1996, USS BUNKER HILL (CG-S2) loaded a theater 
ballistic missile surveillance and tracking program into the Aegis weapon sy£-
tem.3 Computer watchstations acquire, process, display, and disseminate data 
from sensors simultaneously. In air defense, the new Cooperative Engagement 
Capability (CEC) uses a network of microprocessors and a data distribution sys-
tem to share unfiltered radar measurements for composite tracking by dispersed 
aircraft, ships, and ground batteries.4 Electronic, acoustic, infrared, and optical 
systems have many lines of computer code. Satellites and unmanned aerial vehi-
cles, carrying sensors, communication, and data transfer links, are controlled by 
computer programs. National satellite imagery, when netted, enables precise 
geo-positioning for accurate targeting of standoff weapons, as well as mission 
planning, battle assessment, and intelligence support.5 Precision guided muni-
tions depend on sophisticated computer programs for processing weapon en-
gagement data, such as those embedded in the Low Altitude Navigation and 
Infrared-for-Night (LANTIRN) and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Ra-
dar aST ARS) systems. Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technology is being 
exploited so that redesigns and updates in military computers can keep pace with 
the rapid commercial development in home and business computers. 
Webbing and NeHing 
The computing power in transistors mounted on microprocessors has in-
creased dramatically for combat systems in individual aircraft, ships, and battle-
field units. However, it is in the netting and webbing of computers associated with 
command and control, surveillance, targeting, and gathering intelligence that is 
adding a new dimension to warfare.6 In a computer web, commanders at all lev-
els can simultaneously view the same battlespace. The synergism of several net-
works, such as the Joint Planning Network, Joint Data Network, and Joint 
Composite Tracking Network, enhance defense against ballistic and cruise mis-
siles. In both offense and defense, decision-making is speeded up. Innovative 
tactics and "self-synchronization" at the warrior level are facilitated. Coordina-
tion and rapid maneuver among widely dispersed units are enhanced. There is a 
greater opportunity to get inside an adversary's observe, orient, decide, act 
(OODA) loop. Secure video teleconferencing, data base connectivity, direct 
downlink, and broadcast/receive capabilities provide access to intelligence, lo-
gistic, and essential support data, including weather, mapping, terrain, and 
oceanographic predictions.7 The correlation and fusion of data from sensors in 
satellites, aircraft, ships, and battlefield units enable sensor-to-shooter connec-
tivity and precision targeting. A soldier or Marine equipped ,vith a Situational 
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Awareness Beacon with Reply (SABER) has access to thousands of friendly 
force positions every hour, which gready minimizes fratricide in batde.8 The 
emerging global infrastructure of communication networks, computers, data 
bases, and consumer electronics provides the National Command Authorities 
and military commanders with new opportunities to gather intelligence and, 
most importandy, to get indications and warning of a crisis or threat of attack. 
Capabilities, Limitations, and Vulnerabilities 
But with all the high-tech capabilities and potential, computers and their net-
works are only tools of warfare. Humans must make judgments, often based on 
insufficient or ambiguous data. Identification and discrimination regarding mili-
tary targets and civilian casualties are difficult issues and cannot be resolved en-
tirely by computer networks. In Kosovo, for example, restrictions on minimum 
altitudes and the types of authorized targets made it difficult for NATO forces to 
destroy an enemy who had no requirement to shoot, move, or expose himsel£ 9 
Then there is the reality that computer networks are not always available or fully 
operable. Hard drives jam, memories fail, adapters burn out, cables sever, and 
servers saturate. IO Difficult challenges of configuration control, standard com-
puter language, reliability, and interoperability abound.ll The Office of Man-
agement and Budget places the number of Defense Department computer 
systems at 8,145, of which 2,096 are deemed critical to military operations.12 
Furthermore, it is not easy to move "zeros" and "ones" where needed when 
bandwidth is constrained. There is also the ever-present problem of recruiting 
and retaining trained personnel to operate and maintain the sophisticated com-
puter networks. In addition, data is not information. It is raw material that needs 
to be processed to obtain ground truth and avoid saturation. Since all data when 
displayed looks equally valid, computer-aided tools and filters are required to as-
sign confidence levels to the accuracy of the information.13 
For high-tech military forces, the capabilities of computers and their net-
works far outweigh the limitations. But technical issues need to be vigorously 
addressed. Systems must be designed with greater robustness, redundancy, and 
the ability to degrade gracefully.14 Security systems (firewalls, shielding, intru-
sion detection devices, personnel checks, motion sensors, encryption, anti-virus 
software, and training) are required. But firewalls and intrusion detection de-
vices can be bypassed, and all software is inherendy flawed. IS It must be recog-
nized that command and control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance systems have become much more vulnerable in information 
warfare. 16 This is especially true in communication systems, which rely on a 
149 
Computer Networks, Proportionality, and Military Operations 
combination of military and civilian satellite networks and transponders. War 
games, modeling and simulation, and actual incidents reveal a number of meth-
ods to attack computer networks. These include physical disruption of hardware 
and software, insertion of a virus, worm, or logic bomb into a computer pro-
gram, flooding networks with false data, buffer overflows, malformed data, and 
e-mail attachments, as well as unsophisticated jamming. 17 Intelligence gathering 
satellites, military communication networks, sensor downlinks, and precision 
targeting could be disrupted or defeated. But low-tech military forces, while less 
dependent on computer networks, may, in some cases, be just as vulnerable to 
CNA. Command and control may be a single path network without redun-
dancy and fall-back alternatives. Satellite communications may be completely 
unprotected. In addition to the vulnerabilities of information systems, computer 
network technology employed offensively has the potential of producing devas-
tating effects on both military support (fuel, spare parts, transportation, mobili-
zation, and medical supplies) and the civilian infrastructure (air traffic control, 
electrical generation, water distribution, hospital life support, emergency ser-
vices, currency control, and, ominously, nuclearreactor operations). Thus, both 
high and low-tech military commanders and their national command authori-
ties need to thoroughly analyze the legal and policy implications before resorting 
to CNA operations, either in offense or defense. Then, there are the unfriendly 
"hackers" and terrorist groups eager to exploit vulnerability asymmetries at 
whatever risk and at relatively low cost. Cyberspace is a highly competitive envi-
ronment world-wide. The long term effectiveness of computer networks may 
be less about technology and more about the ability to organize and innovate. 
CNA and Consequences 
As indicated in the lead-off definition, a CNA can either be an attack on the 
information resident in computers and computer networks or a direct attack on 
the computers and their networks. Whether a CNA constitutes an "armed at-
tack"18 depends not on the means and methods used, but on the resulting conse-
quences.19 The means and methods of attack may be similar to other offensive 
information operations, such as psychological or electronic warfare, but the 
consequences may be severe injury, suffering, death, or destruction of property, 
and amount to or rise to the level of an armed attack. On the other hand, the 
consequences may be intrusive, annoying, or disruptive, but not an imminent 
threat to life or limb, or intended to cause direct damage or injury. In both of-
fense and defense, US military commanders are guided by the Standing Rules of 
Engagement (SROE) for US military forces. The SROE bridge the transition 
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between jus ad bellum and jus in bello by implementing the inherent right of 
self-defense and providing guidance for the application of force to accomplish 
the mission.2o They are based on national policy, operational requirements, and 
US domestic and intemationallaw, including the law of armed conflict. The el-
ements of self-defense and mission accomplishment are necessity and propor-
tionality, although the meanings in the self-defense context are much different 
than when applied under the law of armed conflict for mission accomplishment. 
The SROE make no distinction in the guidelines for self-defense and mission 
accomplishment between an attack with conventional weapons and a computer 
network attack. Thus, the same general criteria would apply, with supplemental 
measures for a specific operation that might well include guidance on CNA 
operations. 
Self-Defense (Jus acl Bellum) 
A military force on a post-Cold War mission (humanitarian, peacekeeping, 
crisis control) could well be confronted with a computer network attack. The 
attacker could be a malicious hacker, terrorist group, or foreign armed force. 
Under the US SROE, necessity requires that the military commander must first 
determine whether the CNA is in fact either a hostile act or a clear demonstra-
tion of hostile intent before he decides that it is necessary to respond. An armed 
attack, such as sinking a ship, firing on troops, invading territory, blockading 
ports, or mining harbors would in most circumstances be regarded as hostile acts. 
A physical or kinetic attack against the computer networks that are vital for com-
mand and control, surveillance, targeting, or early warning could well preclude 
or impede the mission and thus also be considered a hostile act. On the other 
hand, a cyberspace intrusion into these same computer networks mayor may 
not be a hostile act, although a disruption of the satellite network that provides 
indications of an ICBM launch might, per se, be a hostile act since active de-
fenses are not yet available, and in any event, cueing information is so crucial. 
Although the CNA may not rise to the level of a hostile act, the consequences 
may demonstrate hostile intent, that is, placing the military force in imminent 
danger. Hostile intent, however demonstrated, has always been a difficultjudg-
ment call. The determination is both objective and subjective, influenced by 
up-to-date intelligence on an adversary and his prior conduct. One military 
writer has described the concept as an "expression of the national right of antici-
patory self-defense at the unit level. "21 Locking on an aircraft with fire control 
radar, approaching on an attack profile, massing tanks and troops on the border, 
or mobilizing the military and civilian infrastructure for war can all be evidence 
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of hostile intent. In cyberspace, there are a wide variety of methods of attack pre-
viously mentioned that could adversely affect a military commander's computer 
networks. However, the means of attack and the consequences may not be tan-
gibly present-no "see and touch" evidence. Besides, since cyberspace attacks 
are inherently anonymous, covert, seamlessly interconnected, and travel across 
international boundaries via relay points, it is difficult to identify and trace the 
source, and establish attribution. Is the perpetrator military or civilian, State-
sponsored, a rogue organization, or an individual acting on his own? Absent a 
conventional attack component, manipulation or intrusion by itself does not au-
tomatically indicate hostile intent. A CNA intrusion into the communications 
network could be just an intelligence probe for future operations. But a CNA to 
disrupt the air defense and targeting networks could be the critical step before 
launching an armed attack. There are many examples on both sides of the ledger, 
and critical questions to ponder. Do the consequences of a particular CNA place 
the military force in inuninent danger? Is an adversary attempting to prepare the 
battlefield for an armed attack that is likely, imminent, or unavoidable? Is this the 
last opportunity for the military commander to counter the threat?22 If so, the 
ingredients are there for hostile intent and the necessity to act. 
In a CNA situation, just as in a conventional attack, the response to counter 
the threat must be proportional, whether in anticipatory or actual self-defense. 
That is, under the US SROE, "the force used must be reasonable in intensity, 
duration, and magnitude, based on all the facts known to the commander at the 
time, to decisively counter the hostile act or hostile intent and to ensure the con-
tinued safety of US forces."23 In self-defense "proportionality points at a sym-
metry or approximation in 'scale and effects' between the unlawful force and the 
lawful counter-force .... A comparison must be made between the quantum of 
force and counter-force used, as well as the casualties and damage sustained. "24 
A military commander must decide what weapons, means of delivery, counter-
measures, and tactics are the most appropriate for the situation. For example, the 
Doctrine for Joint Operations in operations other than war provides that "mili-
tary force be applied prudently .... Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of 
violence characterize the environment."25 The objective is to respond withjust 
enough force to control the threat and protect the forces. The response need not 
be in kind or executed on the spot, if time permits due consideration. For exam-
ple, in Operation EARNEST WILL (reflagging and protecting Kuwaiti tankers 
during the Iran-Iraq Tanker War), after the USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS 
(FFG-58) hit an Iranian-laid mine, the appropriate and proportional response 
selected by the National Command Authorities was to attack Iranian oil plat-
forms, attacking Iranian ships only if they fired on US ships.26 On the other 
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hand, a theater ballistic missile fired at the military force or a facility under its 
protection requires action within minutes to acquire, track, and engage the mis-
sile. Also guiding a military commander in responding to an attack, CNA or 
conventional, will be a nation's policy objectives. US policy, as stated in the 
SROE, is to maintain a stable international environment and provide an effec-
tive and credible deterrent to armed attack. If deterrence fails, in addition to be-
ing proportional, the response should be designed to limit the scope and 
intensity of a conflict, discourage escalation, and achieve political and military 
objectives.27 Finally, the use offorce is normally the last resort. When time and 
circumstances permit, the potentially hostile force should be warned and given 
the opportunity to withdraw or cease threatening actions.28 
During the Naval War College symposium, "Computer Network Attack and 
International Law," the Proportionality Working Group discussed various ap-
proaches for developing a response to a CNA.29 One such framework would be 
to analyze the attack in categories of consequences, such as a network attack with 
only network effects, a network attack with network and conventional effects, 
and a conventional attack with network and conventional effects. For each cate-
gory evaluated, a military commander could consider various options for a pro-
portional response: computer network only, both computer network and 
conventional, or conventional only. In reaching a judgment, a military com-
mander, guided by the SROE, might pose a series of questions to be resolved for 
each option, matched against each category: Is there time for a warning to cease 
threatening actions and an opportunity for the adversary to withdraw? Does the 
CNA place the military force in imminent danger? Is the CNA the final stage in 
preparing the battlefield for an attack? Is this the last opportunity for a military 
commander to protect his force? Is the response contemplated reasonable in in-
tensity, duration, and magnitude? Will the response effectively counter the 
threat and remove his force from danger? Is a computer network response or a 
conventional response the most appropriate, or a combination ofboth? If a com-
puter network response, is there an ability to accurately assess the consequences? 
Does a computer network response involve a cross-border intrusion? Will the 
response assist in stabilizing the immediate crisis? Is the response designed to 
limit the scope and intensity of an impending conflict? Does it discourage escala-
tion? Is the response consistent with maintaining a credible deterrent to further 
CNAs? What will be the effects, intended or unintended, on civilians, their 
property and infrastructure? Can these effects be distinguished from effects on 
military personnel, equipment, and infrastructure? 
In the case of a CNA ,vith only network effects, the consequences, although 
degrading a particular computer network, may not place the force in imminent 
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danger or be evidence of an impending attack. The appropriate response might 
be to shift to an alternate network, use computer countermeasures to e).-pel the 
intruder, sanitize the system, and report to higher authority. This situation 
would be analogous to tolerating an aircraft tracking radar, but not a locked on 
fire control radar. Higher authority, with the requisite technical e).-pertise and 
network connections, could trace the intrusion, identify the perpetrator, and 
take appropriate action, such as a complaint to the relay State, if the CNA ap-
pears to be State-sponsored. Or, if the intrusion is an intelligence probe, higher 
authority might choose to play the game and "grab the hacker," feeding him 
false information covertly. If, however, the network effects disable the air and 
missile defense network and are judged as the overriding evidence of armed at-
tack, the immediate response might be to launch a conventional attack against 
the most threatening military targets-tanks and troops, aircraft on runways, 
missile sites, command headquarters, and the like. Such a response would be 
timely and might discourage an adversary from attacking or, at least, indicate that 
there will be a high cost to proceeding. This would not rule out a follow-up 
computer network response against, for example, the adversary's military com-
mand and control network, executed at the appropriate level by trained network 
experts. In either situation of a CNA with network effects only, the proportion-
ality set-point to trigger a response in kind should be high since the intrusion 
may be ambiguous and non-threatening or the response would not be timely, 
effective, or within the capability of the operational commander to execute. 
In a crisis situation, an adversary may choose to initiate a CNA that has both 
network and conventional effects, such as manipulating the air traffic control 
network of an aircraft carrier that causes collisions or near misses of aircraft in the 
approach and landing pattern. This attack would be less risky than attacking the 
carrier or its air wing. The overall effect is to raise the level of hostility and re-
solve some of the ambiguity in identifying the source. Obviously the situation 
cannot be tolerated. If overall intelligence plus the conventional effects can pre-
sumptively attribute the CNA to a particular adversary, the initial response 
might be a stem warning to cease the hazardous computer operations, in addi-
tion to shifting to an alternate control mode, attempting to e).-pel the perpetra-
tor, and sanitizing the system. If, despite the warning and opportunity to cease, 
the disruption continues, the military commander might respond with a con-
ventional, precision attack against the most appropriate military target that 
would reinforce the warning with force. Such targets might be a facility for the 
production of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, ballistic missile 
launchers that are not yet mobile, or a new warship about to be launched. This 
would be analogous to the response when the USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS 
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hit the Iranian mine which was laid arbitrarily to hazard both warships and mer-
chant ships. That response was neither in kind nor executed immediately. If the 
computer specialists also have the capability to intrude and disrupt one of the ad-
versary's vital military computer networks, this would also be an appropriate and 
timely response. All of these responses are intended to control the crisis, discour-
age escalation, and avoid collateral damage and incidental injury to civilians. 
In the case of a physical attack against a computer network asset itself, such as 
destroying a satellite (communications, navigation, imagery) or damaging a 
command and control (C2) node, the conventional effects are tangible and seri-
ous. The source and location can probably be pinpointed. Destruction of a satel-
lite \vithout other evidence of hostile intent would not warrant an immediate 
physical or CNA response. But such an extraordinary act would have implica-
tions and effects world-wide, and would merit immediate attention at the high-
est levels of government, as well as the United Nations Security Council. If the 
destruction of the satellite or damage to the C2 facility is the prelude to armed at-
tack, a robust and direct conventional response to blunt the attack would proba-
bly be the most effective. All military targets that are part of or supporting the 
attack would be fair game. The objective would be to protect the force, control 
the threat, discourage escalation, and, at the same time, avoid collateral damage 
and incidental injury to civilians. A parallel CNA response to degrade, manipu-
late, or destroy information resident in the adversary's C2 computer networks 
might effectively complement the conventional response. This response might 
target networks that support the armed attack, taking care to avoid unintended 
network effects that injure or kill civilians or damage their property. Here, the 
problem is sorting out the network effects that may be inextricably linked in the 
military and civilian infrastructure. 
There are numerous examples of network and/or conventional conse-
quences and responses to a CNA that can be analyzed in the categories postu-
lated. The most appropriate and proportional response will depend on a careful 
consideration of the facts, context, and intelligence in each particular case, what-
ever method of determination is pursued. 
Mission Accomplishment (Jus in Bello) 
A military force involved in a crisis or action in self-defense that develops into 
a low intensity conflict or prolonged war could be authorized to conduct CNA 
operations, that is, attack the information resident in computers and computer 
networks, or attack the computers and their networks direcdy. In applying force 
to accomplish a mission, the SROE provides that US forces will be governed by 
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the law of anned conflict30 and rules of engagement. Also, as mentioned previ-
ously, the elements of mission accomplishment are necessity and proportional-
ity. Hostile acts and intent are presumed. Necessity means that attacks must be 
limited to military objectives,31 and that force has to be constrained to that re-
quired to accomplish the mission.32 Proportionality in mission accomplishment, 
however, unlike self-defense, is not a comparison and symmetry between the 
quantum offorce and counterforce used.33 The objective is to defeat the enemy 
as rapidly as possible. Disproportionate force may be, and often is, required. But 
in applying counterforce, the law of anned conflict requires that a military com-
mander observe the principle of distinction between combatants and noncom-
batants,34 precautions in attack,35 and the law oftargeting.36 Although it is not 
unlawful to cause incidental injury to civilians, or collateral damage to civilian 
objects, incidental or collateral damage must not be excessive in the light of the 
military advantage anticipated by the attack.37 In applying this proportionality 
balancing test, a military commander must take all reasonable precautions, based 
on infonnation available at the time, to keep civilian casualties and damage con-
sistent with mission accomplishment. He must also consider alternative methods 
of attack to reduce civilian casualties and damage. In addition to jlls in bello pro-
scriptions, a military commander will be guided by supplemental measures in the 
ROE that "define the limits or grants of authority for the use offorce for mission 
accomplishment. "38 
The Proportionality Working Group39also explored approaches for analyz-
ing CNA offensive operations. For example, the CNA might be a network at-
tack against a network target, a network attack against a non-network target, or a 
conventional (kinetic) attack against a network target. These categories, while 
overlapping and arbitrary, are intended to assist in focusing on the effects and 
consequences of a CNA. For each option evaluated in terms of effects and con-
sequences, a military commander, guided by the SROE and battle plan, might 
pose a series of questions to be resolved: Will the CNA capture important enemy 
intelligence? Does it assist in getting inside the enemy's OODA loop? Can the 
CNA disrupt, control, or destroy the enemy's computer networks for intelli-
gence collection and targeting? Will it contribute to establishing infonnation 
dominance, air and maritime superiority, and space control? Does the CNA 
provide the military commander with new options for favorably controlling the 
rhythm of the battle? Will it influence the enemy to terminate military action 
and alter policy? Does the CNA degrade an enemy's supporting infrastructure? 
Is it essential in protecting own forces, equipment, and facilities? Overall, does 
the CNA contribute to the partial or complete submission of the enemy \vith the 
least expenditure of life, time, and resources? In coalition warfare, does it 
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preserve unity of effort and consensus in waging war? Does the CNA respect the 
inviolability of neutrals and their commerce? Is the CNA consistent with United 
Nations Security Council enforcement action, if any? Does the CNA involve 
cross-border intrusions? Is it compatible with diplomatic and political efforts to 
achieve a cease-fire, suspension of hostilities, armistice agreement, peace treaty, 
or other termination of the war? What are the effects of the CNA on protected 
persons (civilians; wounded, sick, and shipwrecked; medical personnel and 
chaplains; and prisoners of war)? What incidental injury to civilians or collateral 
damage is anticipated from the CNA, based on the best means to accurately as-
sess the primary and secondary effects of a CNA? Can the military effects be dis-
tinguished from the civilian effects? Is the incidental injury or collateral damage 
likely to be excessive in the light of the military advantage anticipated? Will it 
cause unnecessary suffering or be indiscriminate in nature? Are there alternative 
means and methods of attack that will reduce civilian casualties and damage from 
that considered likely from the CNA? Will a decision to withhold network attacks 
against network or non-network targets influence an enemy to also refrain from 
similar network attacks, and can this restraint be relied upon? Finally, pertinent 
to each of the questions, does the network or non-network target by its nature, 
purpose, or use make an effective contribution to the enemy's military action, 
and thus constitute a lawful military objective of the CNA. 
In the category of a network attack against a network target, the intention is 
to adversely affect the infomwtion resident in the enemy's computer network. 
Examples include introducing information or disinformation (not perfidious) 
into the computer network to influence or mislead behavior, intruding with a 
data device or technique to degrade the military C2 network, disrupting vital 
links in the integrated air defense (lAD) network, or manipulating the military 
communication network to confuse the timing of a maneuver or attack. In these 
and similar offensive computer operations, the ultimate consequences are nei-
ther intended nor anticipated to involve incidental injury or collateral damage. 
Psychologically, the civilian population may, as intended, be influenced, but the 
effects would not be physical. A computer intrusion into the enemy's intelli-
gence network to capture vital information, or indications and warning, would 
be a necessary step in preparing the batdespace, and probably would not even fall 
,vithin the definition of a CNA. In any event, a network attack on the informa-
tion in a computer network that is tailored to produce limited physical conse-
quences may prove to be an effective non-lethal tool of warfare against military 
objectives. An alternative conventional attack calculated to degrade the C2 and 
lAD networks, for example, could result in civilian casualties and damage. 
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However, in most cases, these effects would probably not be considered exces-
sive in the light of the military advantage anticipated. 
In the case of a network attack against a non-network target, the intention is to 
damage or destroy military objectives through the medium of a CNA operating 
on the information resident in the enemy's computer network. Examples would 
include disrupting the military air traffic control system to induce collisions or 
crashes, causing a military satellite to lose control and implode, disabling the elec-
trical system in the enemy's C2 facility, and manipulating the computer network 
that manages vital military support. For these and other military targets, and as-
suming an ability to accurately assess the primary and secondary effects, CNA op-
erations may prove to be an effective method of prosecuting the war at less risk to 
one's own forces. However, network attacks on the civilian infrastructure, even 
though it supports the enemy's military effort, raises difficult issues. It may not be 
possible to distinguish the military from the civilian effects because of the ineJ..-tn-
cable linkage between the two. Even if that is possible, the CNA may set off a 
chain of effects that cascades beyond the military and into civilian institutions. This 
could raise questions of whether the CNA was indiscriminate and not directed at a 
valid military objective. Furthermore, a cascading CNA might result in disastrous 
consequences on essential services for the civilian population (electrical power, 
water distribution, life support, nuclear power operations). Even assuming, for ex-
ample, a CNA against an electrical power grid that supports the military effort, and 
is therefore a valid military objective, there must be no indiscriminate cascading 
effects, and under the proportionality and balancing test, any incidental injury and 
collateral damage must not be excessive in view of the military advantage antici-
pated. The point is not to rule out CNAs in this category, but to urge caution in 
their use in view of the uncertainty in predicting effects. 
An attack against an enemy's computers and computer networks \vith mis-
siles, bombs, or artillery shells is the traditional means of attack. A military com-
mander must insure that the various computer network sites and facilities are 
valid military targets and that incidental injury and collateral damage are kept to a 
minimum. Damage or destruction ofC2 war rooms and command posts, for ex-
ample, would contribute significantly to defeating the enemy. Air defense sites, 
microwave stations, data relay facilities, and communication satellites can also be 
electronically jammed from aircraft, ground stations, and warships. Damage or 
destruction of a dual-use military and civilian satellite would raise serious issues 
for high-tech military forces that are becoming extraordinarily dependent on 
satellites for both military and commercial purposes. Should the commander re-
frain from attacking the satellite in the hope that the enemy will also exercise re-
straint? Is the dual-use satellite a valid military target when the band\vidth used 
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by the military is relatively minor? Disruption, damage, or destruction of com-
puter network facilities that provide essential civilian services, as well as support 
the military effort, such as electrical power grids, may be unavoidable in prose-
cuting the war. But difficult proportionality judgments must be made even 
though there may not be the unpredictable cascading effects produced by a 
CNA. An assessment must be made that the civilian injury and damage will not 
be excessive in the light of the military advantage anticipated. Temporarily dis-
abling the power grids by attacking with carbon chaff, for example, may reduce 
casualties and avoid more serious consequences, as well as influencing behavior. 
Attacking computers and computer networks serving primarily the civilian in-
frastructure, such as banking systems, stock exchanges, water management, and 
research centers, would be difficult to justify in terms of a military advantage and 
would probably result in excessive civilian injury and damage. 
Just as in the jus ad bellum situation, there are many examples of actual or po-
tential CNA offensive operations. While mission accomplishment proportion-
ality takes on a different meaning from that in self-defense, the balancing test of 
military advantage versus excessive incidental injury and collateral damage must 
consider both the actual and cascading effects of a CNA, whatever method of 
analysis is used. 
Observations 
CNA operations as part of information warfare or network-centric warfare 
are in their infancy, with far-reaching implications for law, policy, and rules of 
engagement. The ability to predict and assess the damage from executing a CNA 
in offense or defense, similar to a precision strike weapon, is far from assured. 
CNAs may well prove to be invaluable in defeating the enemy and countering 
an attack, provided that trained and experienced computer network experts can 
accurately "hit" the target, control the effects, and avoid unintended cascading 
consequences. This assumes that CNA operations are authorized at the appro-
priate level. All this adds to the complexity of proportionality judgments. How-
ever, the basic rules injus ad bellum and jus in bello still apply. An analysis of the 
targeting must be conducted for a CNAjust as it is conducted for attacks using 
conventional weapons. On the defense side, the old adage of the best defense is a 
good offense may be turned on its head in the case ofCNA operations. There is 
no question that a high-tech military force with significant network vulnerabili-
ties must have a robust, passive protection against CNA. This requires increased 
awareness, training, technical support, hardware and software improvements, 
greater redundancy, and an ability to degrade gracefully in computer network 
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equipment and systems. It also means that military commanders must plan and 
train to "work-around" network attacks that disrupt, deny, or destroy critical 
information resident in their computers and computer networks. This is partic-
ularly important since rogue and terrorist groups without asymmetrical vulner-
abilities can wage network war on the cheap with little regard for the risk. 
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